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Abstract: This paper examines the prospects for a conceptual or functional role the-
ory of moral concepts. It is argued that such an account is well-placed to explain
both the irreducibility and practicality of moral concepts. Several versions of con-
ceptual role semantics for moral concepts are distinguished, depending on whether
the concept-constitutive conceptual roles are (i) wide or narrow (ii) normative or
non-normative and (iii) purely doxastic or conative. It is argued that the most plau-
sible version of conceptual role semantics for moral concepts involves only ‘nar-
row’ conceptual roles, where these include connections to motivational, desire-
like, states. In the penultimate section it is argued, contrary to what Wedgwood,
Enoch and others have claimed, that such an account of moral concepts cannot
plausibly be combined with the claim that moral concepts refer to robust proper-
ties.
What is a moral concept? An answer to this question should cohere with our best
general theories of the nature of concepts. In this paper I take one such theory—
conceptual or functional role semantics—and consider its application to the moral
case.1 I proceed as follows. In Section 1, I provide deﬁnitions of key terms. In
Section 2, I motivate a conceptual or functional role approach to moral concepts. In
Section 3, I elucidate some of the decisions a defender of this theory must face,
resulting in several distinct versions of the theory. In Section 4, I argue that all
but two of these versions are implausible. In Section 5, I consider one of the re-
maining versions —elucidated by Wedgwood and tentatively endorsed by Enoch
and Eklund—and ask whether it can be plausibly combined with the further claim
that moral concepts refer to robust properties. I argue that it cannot. I conclude that
the only plausible version of conceptual role semantics for moral terms is a version
of metaethical non-cognitivism: according to this view, moral concepts are individ-
uated in terms of functional ties to motivating states.
1. Deﬁnitions
This paper is concerned with whether conceptual role semantics can provide a
plausible account of moral concepts and, if so, how this might affect existing de-
bates in metaethics, speciﬁcally debates between cognitivism and non-cognitivism.
The underlined terms need further explication, which will occupy the rest of this
section.
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1.1. Cognitivism and Non-cognitivism
This debate concerns the status of moral states of mind, such as my judgement that
murder is wrong. According to cognitivists, moral judgements are maps of a moral
reality: they are beliefs about the way of the world, morally speaking. Hence moral
predicative concepts, such as good and evil, are taken to refer (or putatively refer)
to robust properties in the world.2 Non-cognitivists deny that moral judgements
are moral beliefs, claiming instead that they are distinctive insofar as they involve
a particular type of motivational state, akin to a desire or preference.3 Hence, non-
cognitivists also deny that moral predicative concepts refer to worldly properties;
instead, they are distinguished by their connection to motivational states. Neither
cognitivism nor non-cognitivism per se is committed to the existence (or non-exis-
tence) of a moral reality which our judgements might correctly describe: theirs is
a psychological rather than metaphysical dispute. Even so, the most popular form
of cognitivism is realist in this way. For this paper the concern is with the psycho-
logical dispute, not the related metaphysical one.
1.2. Concepts
Roughly, concepts are parts of thoughts. Precisely, a concept is an element of the
semantically evaluable content of a propositional attitude that contributes to that
content in a systematic way. Relatedly, where a propositional attitude has such a
content we can say that that attitude involves or deploys its constituent concepts.4
For example, a belief that grass is green is a propositional attitude with the propo-
sitional content grass is green, which is semantically evaluable as true or false.5 The
concepts grass, green and is (more precisely, the ‘is’ of predication or isp) are
elements of this content (and thus are involved in the mental state) and contribute
to it and other contents in systematic ways. For example, the presence of isp in an
unembedded position in this content indicates that the content concerns the attri-
bution of a (putative) property to a subject.
Many concepts are associated with Fregean senses or modes of presentation (the
exceptions are concepts such as conjunction and, perhaps, proper names).6 In other
words, many concepts specify ways in which objects, properties or space-time re-
gions can be represented in thought. Imagine, for instance, that the lawn before me
is mine, green, the prettiest in the neighbourhood and the cause of my uncle’s heart
attack. To think of the lawn under these different descriptions is to think of it using
different concepts. Being thus at the level of Fregean senses, concepts are individ-
uated by considerations of cognitive signiﬁcance. Thus two concepts are distinct
iff. two complete propositional contents that differ only insofar as they involve re-
placing one concept for the other can differ in informativeness.7 For instance, today
it is news to me that my lawn is on the route of a proposed bypass, whereas it is not
news to me that my lawn is green. Hence, on the route of a proposed bypass and
green are distinct concepts.
It is worth noting that concepts can be shared by speakers of different languages
and that not all signiﬁcant linguistic expressions express concepts. Greetings such
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as ‘Hiyo!’ and exclamations such as ‘What Ho!’ are signiﬁcant, yet do not express
concepts. The reason is that such utterances do not express attitudes with seman-
tically evaluable contents, and concepts are parts of such contents. It follows that
a complete theory of concepts cannot be the sole basis for a complete theory of lin-
guistic meaning.8 Note ﬁnally that the preceding explication of concepts is not
intended solely to reﬂect common usage of the word ‘concept’; it is partly
stipulative, intending to delineate a notion appropriate to the goals of philosophi-
cal and psychological theory.9
1.3. Moral Concepts
Concepts are parts of thoughts and moral concepts are parts of moral thoughts.
More particularly, they are the parts of moral thoughts that make those thoughts
distinctively moral or, more simply, they are distinctively moral concepts. That
these remarks are unhelpful is to be expected, for one of the issues at stake in the
current context is the correct account of moral concepts. One way of avoiding this
paradox of inquiry is to use exemplars. If anything is a moral concept, then the
concept expressed by sincere assertoric use of the English expression ‘morally
right’ is. When Theresa May, say, claims that giving harsh judicial sentences to ri-
oters is the morally right thing to do, there is little doubt that she is expressing a
moral thought. What makes this thought moral is the concept of moral rightness.
What is required is an account of that sort of concept and its kin (although the
resulting account may force us to rethink where we draw the kinship boundaries).
Hence, by moral concepts I shall mean concepts of the type (whatever it is)
expressed by Theresa May’s sincere use of the expression ‘morally right’.
1.4. Conceptual Role Semantics
As understood here, conceptual role semantics (henceforth ‘CRS’) is a general ac-
count of the intentional content of concepts and thoughts, that is, a theory of men-
tal representation. Related views are sometimes presented as (foundational)
accounts of linguistic meaning or more generally as theories of ‘representations’,
a term intended to cover both types of case.10 However, the focus in this paper will
be with CRS as an account of the content of concepts and thoughts and in partic-
ular as an account of the content of moral concepts and thoughts. I leave open
the question as to how this might relate to an account of linguistic meaning.11
In its most basic form, CRS claims:
The contents of concepts and thoughts are determined by their functional
role in a person’s psychology. (Harman 1982: 242)
Where ‘functional role’ includes a state’s actual and hypothetical
… role in thinking, problem solving, deliberation and the like—and, in
general, in mediating between sensory inputs and behavioural outputs.
(Block 1987: 160)
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Here, ‘deliberation’ includes both theoretical and practical reasoning: the former
being the process of deriving or inferring mental states from others, where this
ends in belief, and the latter being the process of deriving or inferring mental states
from others, where this ends in intention or action.12
The general idea behind CRS is as follows. A particular intentional state will
play a particular role in an agent’s psychology, both in the actual case and in hypo-
thetical cases where it is grouped with other, now absent, mental states.13 It may
have typical causes in perception and/or typically lead, via processes of theoretical
or practical reasoning, to further mental states. It may make rational, provide evi-
dence for, or itself be evidentially supported by (the contents of) other mental
states. It may affect the agent’s behaviour in predictable ways, the precise effects
depending on the states it is coupled with. CRS claims that some proper set of
these relations to perception, other mental states and action—that is, the state’s
‘conceptual role’—determines the intentional content of the state. For concepts,
content is also determined by conceptual role, where the conceptual role of a con-
cept (as opposed to the conceptual role of an intentional state) is determined by the
systematic contribution it makes to the conceptual roles of the intentional states in
which it occurs.14 According to this view, two concepts are identical iff. replacing
one for the other in a propositional attitude results in an attitude with an un-
changed conceptual role. According to CRS, therefore, possessing a concept is a
matter of possessing mental states that conform to certain conceptual roles: master-
ing the concept involves mastering these roles, that is, at a minimum, having a gen-
eral (perhaps defeasible) disposition to follow them.15
2. Motivating CRS for Moral Concepts
This characterisation of CRS will need to be reﬁned later, in light of the several
choices which defenders of the view face (Section 3). But it is already sufﬁcient
to see that the prospects for a CRS account of moral concepts look bright. This is
for two general types of reason. First, because many of the general arguments in
favour of CRS apply to the moral case. Second, because there are particular fea-
tures of moral concepts that make them amenable to a CRS-based account. I take
these types of arguments in turn.
2.1. General Arguments for CRS
2.1.1. The ‘There-Must-be-More-to-Content-Than-Reference’ Argument
Reference (in the case of concepts) and truth-conditions (in the case of proposi-
tional contents) are too crude for differentiating content. For example, the concepts
Hesperus and Phosphorus have the same reference but distinct content, as shown
by usual tests of cognitive signiﬁcance: one can believe that Hesperus is bright
without believing that Phosphorus is bright. Likewise, Hesperus is a planet and
Phosphorus is a planet have the same truth-condition—they are true iff. the thing
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we now call ‘Venus’ is a planet—but differ in cognitive signiﬁcance. Hence, refer-
ence and truth-conditions are insufﬁciently ﬁne-grained to provide a complete ac-
count of the differences between the members of these pairs of concepts and
thoughts.16 If connections with objects and conditions in the world cannot explain
the difference between these pairs of concepts and thoughts, it seems that connec-
tions within the head must. The obvious account is, therefore, that the members of
these pairs are distinct because they have different conceptual roles ‘inside the
head’. For example, Hesperus contributes to conceptual role by tying intentional
states which contain it to thoughts of the evening, whereas Phosphorus contrib-
utes by providing connections to thoughts of the morning. Likewise, believing that
Hesperus is a planet ties to the belief that the morning star is a planet, whereas be-
lieving that Phosphorus is a planet does not (ceteris paribus). Hence, the difference
in conceptual role provides for the difference in content.
This argument extends to the moral case. The concepts German Chancellor
from 1933 to 1945 and most evil individual of the 20th century refer to the
same person but differ in cognitive signiﬁcance. The best explanation of this is
their differing conceptual roles inside the head: thoughts containing the former
are tied to thoughts of Germany (for example), whereas thoughts containing
the latter are tied to thoughts of moral reprehensibility and (perhaps) certain
emotions. Whatever the precise differences in conceptual role, it seems that
some such difference is the best explanation of the difference between these
co-referring concepts. Hence, moral concepts are, at least in part, distinguished
by their conceptual role.
2.1.2. The Argument from Understanding
This argument can be stated as follows.17 First, a theory of concepts is a theory of
what it is to possess concepts, that is, to grasp or understand them. If we want a
theory of grass, for example, we need to examine thinkers who understand grass
and ask what distinguishes them from those that do not. As Peacocke (1992: 5)
puts it: ‘[t]here can be nothing more to the nature of a concept than is determined
by a correct account of the capacity of a thinker who has mastered the concept to
have propositional attitudes to contents containing the concept’. To deny this claim
(Peacocke calls it the ‘Principle of Dependence’) is to hold the implausible view
that two agents with exactly the same propositional-attitude-forming capacities
(that is, who instantiate the same possession conditions) might nevertheless be
employing different concepts.18 Second, understanding or grasping a concept con-
sists in having an appropriate functional organisation, that is, mastering the rele-
vant conceptual role. For example, one will not count as possessing grass unless
one is generally disposed to accept that if an ostended object is grass, then it is a
plant (ceteris paribus). As Millar (1994: 74) puts it ‘possession conditions… reﬂect
the actual belief-forming and belief-adjusting practices of those who possess the
relevant concepts’. Hence, the argument proceeds: a theory of concepts is a theory
of concept-possession; concept-possession involves elements of the agents’
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thoughts instantiating certain conceptual roles; hence, a theory of concepts is a the-
ory of conceptual roles.
Again, this argument applies to the moral case. If we want a theory of evil, for
instance, we need to examine thinkers who possess this concept. Further, one will
not count as possessing it unless one is disposed (ceteris paribus) to accept certain
inferences—that evil is not good, for example—and also (perhaps) to have certain
attitudes (to disapprove of evil, for example). Thus, this argument supports CRS
for moral concepts.
2.1.3. The Argument from Charity
A ﬁnal general argument concerns the principle of charity. In the present context,
this is the claim that in interpreting the thoughts of another ‘we cannot rationally
attribute irrationality without limit’.19 We cannot, for example, suppose that an
agent possesses the concept grass and has no disposition whatsoever to make ra-
tional inferences from propositional attitudes whose contents contain it (of
course, such dispositions may be in place yet defeated). CRS explains this princi-
ple: since, according to CRS, grasping the concept grass requires mastering the
conceptual roles that deﬁne it, an agent who possesses no relevant dispositions
cannot be considered to have mastered these roles, hence does not possess the
concept. More generally, since concept-possession requires mastering conceptual
roles, agents who haven’t mastered the roles cannot be counted as possessing
the concept, so a fortiori cannot be interpreted as consistently deploying the con-
cept in an irrational way. Once again this argument applies, mutatis mutandis, to
the moral case.
2.2. Particular Arguments for CRS for Moral Concepts
The second group of reasons for favouring a CRS approach to moral concepts con-
cerns particular features of those concepts. As Peacocke (1992: 4, 36, 147) notes, a
successful theory of a particular concept should be able to explain all the phenom-
ena that are distinctive of it. That CRS seems apt to explain some well-discussed
features of moral concepts therefore mitigates in its favour.
2.2.1. Irreducibility of Moral Concepts
The ﬁrst particular feature of moral concepts that CRS can explain is their irreduc-
ibility to non-moral concepts. That good and other moral concepts cannot be de-
ﬁned in any non-moral terms is commonly taken to be one conclusion of G.E.
Moore’s open question argument (the other is that moral concepts denote ‘simple
and indeﬁnable’ properties). On Moore’s view, for any proposed deﬁnition of
good, ‘it may always be asked, with signiﬁcance, of the complex so deﬁned,
whether it itself is good’ and the fact that this question is open—that is, not settled
by an understanding of its terms—shows that the proposed deﬁnition cannot, after
all, deﬁne good.20 The point generalises to all moral concepts. What many
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philosophers take this to show is that moral concepts cannot be deﬁned, that is,
that one cannot offer a necessarily true universally quantiﬁed biconditional of
the form ‘x is M iff.…’, where M is a moral concept that the right-hand side gives,
in non-moral terms, necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for x to be M.21
The irreducibility of moral concepts is not universally accepted. Some hold that
moral concepts can be given non-obvious conceptual analyses, others that they can
be reduced to normative concepts, such as the concept of a reason (although many
of these hold that normative concepts themselves are irreducible).22 For present
purposes it is not necessary to adjudicate this disagreement. This is because if
moral concepts are irreducible, then a CRS approach to those concepts can explain
why. Likewise, ifmoral concepts are reducible, CRS can explain that too. This is an
advantage of the account.
To defend these claims, it is necessary to consider the general connection between
CRS and conceptual analysis. The key point is that a CRS account of a given concept
is compatible with, but does not necessitate, the availability of a traditional-style
conceptual analysis of that concept. (Where a traditional-style conceptual analysis
is, roughly, a decompositional analysis that yields a ﬁnite set of independently
graspable and relatively precise necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the
analysandum to apply, and which thus maintains the truth-conditions and cognitive
signiﬁcance of the analysandum; roughly, the type of analysis that has proved so
elusive in the case of knowledge). The difference between the two types of case
concerns the nature of the conceptual roles that deﬁne a concept: in some cases these
will allow, and explain, the availability of a traditional conceptual analysis; in others
they will not. In the ﬁrst instance, CRS will be compatible with a traditional
conceptual analysis when the conceptual roles that deﬁne a concept are such that
mastering them amounts to (implicit or explicit) knowledge of a theory of the (inde-
pendently graspable, relatively precise) necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the
application of a concept.23 Imagine, for instance, that knowledge can be analysed
into justiﬁed true belief, the latter being individually necessary and collectively
sufﬁcient for the former. CRS can explain why such an analysis is available, for it
will propose conceptual roles deﬁnitive of knowledge that have the following form:
(C1) Applyknowledge to x only if one applies justiﬁed, true andknowledge to x.
(C2) Apply justiﬁed to x if one applies knowledge to x.
(C3) Apply true to x if one applies knowledge to x.
(C4) Apply belief to x if one applies knowledge to x.
Mastering these roles amounts to (implicit) knowledge of the necessary and suf-
ﬁcient conditions for x to count as knowledge. Hence, when (and only when) the
conceptual roles that constitute a concept have this form, a traditional conceptual
analysis will be available—its content derivable from the concept-constitutive con-
ceptual roles.
In the second type of case, however, the conceptual roles deﬁnitive of a concept
will not generate a traditional-style conceptual analysis. This will be the case
whenever the concept-constitutive conceptual roles are not such that mastery of
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them amounts to knowledge of the (independent, precise) necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions for the application of the concept. Suppose, for instance, that mastery of
a concept requires grasping that the concept applies to certain prototypical case
and a disposition to apply the concept to any object judged relevantly similar with
respect to that concept, but where the relation of ‘relevant similarity’ cannot be
systematised in a concise, precise and independent set of necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions (and, perhaps, admits of borderline cases). In that case, no traditional-
style conceptual analysis will be forthcoming, since there will be no way of speci-
fying traditional-style necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the concept to ap-
ply.24 More generally, there are many types of conceptual roles other than those
neatly linking the application of a concept to the application of other concepts such
as exhibited in the form (C1)–(C4). These include conceptual roles that involve
judgements about prototypes, relations of family resemblance, connections to per-
ceptual states and connections to motivational states. In all these cases, no tradi-
tional-style conceptual analysis will be possible.25
This general point includes the moral case as an instance. If moral concepts are
irreducible then CRS can explain why: because the conceptual roles mastery of
which constitutes possession of them are not of the (C1)–(C4) form. This may be
because they are of a ‘prototypical’ form, explicated in terms of family resem-
blance, involve connections to perception, motivational states or some combina-
tion of these. On the other hand, if (contrary to Moore) moral concepts are
deﬁnable, then CRS will be able to explain this too: by giving an account of them
in terms of conceptual roles that have the (C1)–(C4) form. Either way, therefore,
CRS can explain the (un)availability of conceptual analyses of moral concepts. This
is a virtue of the account.
2.2.2. Practicality of Moral Concepts
A second more particular argument for applying CRS to moral concepts is closely
related to the ﬁrst. Many have argued that the reason why moral concepts are irre-
ducible to non-moral concepts is that the former embody a certain practicality, or
connection to directing action, that the latter cannot supply. As Johnstone puts it,
an otherwise rational individual, when faced with the claim that an action is un-
pleasant, say, can always ask ‘So what?’, indicating indifference to the alleged
fact.26 But the same agent cannot rationally display the same indifference when
faced with the claim that an action is wrong. Moral epithets seem to go some
way to answering practical questions which all non-moral descriptions leave
open.27 This practicality would certainly explain why the Moorean questions re-
main open: since non-moral concepts are compatible with the practical indifference
that moral concepts rule out.
There is, of course, much dispute about how precisely the practicality of moral
concepts is best explicated.28 However, many philosophers hold that the best way
of elucidating this claim is in the form of some sort of motivational internalism,
that is, as the claim that there is some interesting conceptually necessary connec-
tion between applying a moral concept to an object and an appropriate (defeasible)
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motivation to act accordingly.29 By a ‘conceptually necessary’ connection, de-
fenders of internalism usually mean that it is a connection guaranteed by a proper
mastery of moral concepts, and such that failure to instantiate a connection dis-
qualiﬁes an agent as a competent user (hence possessor) of moral concepts.30
Again, not everyone accepts some form of motivational internalism. But again
CRS need not take a stand in this dispute. For if motivational internalism is true,
then CRS can explain why, and ifmotivational internalism is false, CRS can explain
that too.
First, accepting motivational internalism, CRS will claim that the conceptual
roles that individuate moral concepts are those that tie the application of those
concepts to certain motivational states, such as desires, preferences, plans or in-
tentions. So whereas, for example, the presence of grass in a propositional con-
tent might tie the relevant intentional state to a belief containing the concept
plant, the presence of good in a propositional content might tie the relevant in-
tentional state to a desire to promote or perform.31 Second, if motivational
internalism is denied, CRS can claim that moral concepts generate connections
only to belief-like (or, more precisely, non-motivating) states. Either way, there-
fore, CRS can explain the practical import of moral concepts. This is another vir-
tue of the account.
Finally, suppose one accepts both the irreducibility of moral concepts and their
practicality, cashed out in terms of (some version of) motivational internalism. The
CRS-based explanations of these features provide a certain coherence. A CRS
account of moral concepts that involves conceptual ties to motivational states
explains why moral concepts are motivationally engaged and this in turn explains
why moral concepts cannot be reduced to non-moral concepts. Conceptual ties to
motivational states explain motivational internalism, which in turn explains irreduc-
ibility. If so, then a CRS approach to moral concepts has the considerable attraction
of providing a uniﬁed explanation of both their practicality and irreducibility.
3. Varieties of CRS for Moral Concepts
CRS is not a single theory but a family of similar theories, all of which accept con-
ceptual role as an essential component of the identity of concepts but disagree over
the precise nature of these roles. Below I set out some of the dimensions of dis-
agreement, which will subsequently allow us to distinguish several versions of
CRS for moral concepts.32
3.1. Conceptual Roles: Wide or Narrow
So far I have focused on conceptual roles that involve connections between inten-
tional mental states of a thinker, such as her beliefs, desires and intentions. These
may be called ‘narrow’ or ‘short-arm’ conceptual roles: they concern conceptual
role ‘inside the head’ or ‘from the skin in’. But versions of conceptual role semantics
may also include ‘wide’ or ‘long-arm’ conceptual roles in their accounts of some
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concepts. These wide roles specify connections between intentional mental states and
objects, properties or conditions ‘outside the head’, in the wider world.33 Someone
might claim, for instance, that part of the conceptual role deﬁnitive of water is that
predicative uses of this concept in thought are dominantly (or normally) caused by
instances of the chemical compound H20. An agent whose use of the concept does
not obey this rule would not count as possessing our concept of water. (This might
explain, for example, why apparently similar thoughts had on Earth and on Twin
Earth have different truth conditions; see Putnam 1975 and Burge 1979.)
Several points are worth noting here. First, some may baulk at describing causal
relations between objects and thoughts as ‘conceptual roles’; perhaps the term
‘functional role’ is more appropriate. But this is unproblematic, since the term ‘con-
ceptual role’ is here being deployed as a term of art. Second, wide conceptual roles
are not inferential roles (since inference is a relation between mental states) and are
typically non-normative. In fact, as Block (1987: 178) points out, wide conceptual
roles typically ‘look like a traditional theory of reference’, hence involve relations
such as causation, asymmetric dependence and so on.34 Third, wide conceptual
roles can be incorporated into CRS in at least two ways. On the ﬁrst view—the
‘two-factor view’—some concepts and thoughts have two distinct yet complemen-
tary types of content: ‘narrow content’ determined by narrow conceptual roles
(and shared, for example, by my twin on Twin Earth) and ‘wide content’ deter-
mined in part by wide conceptual roles (and not shared by my twin).35 On the sec-
ond view—the ‘non-solipsistic view’—some concepts and thoughts have one type
of content, but that content is determined by a combination of narrow and wide
conceptual roles.36 I will not distinguish further between these two views here.
Both accept that wide conceptual roles need to be included in a complete account
of the contents of some thoughts and concepts. I leave open the vexed question of
whether or not such views entail a separable notion of narrow content.37 Fourth, I
will share the common assumption that where an account of a concept includes
wide conceptual roles, these are in addition to narrow conceptual roles.38 Conse-
quently, the choice for a defender of CRS is whether to incorporate wide concep-
tual roles alongside narrow roles or whether to include narrow roles only. Fifth
and ﬁnally, there is the issue of how the two types of roles are related. As Fodor
(1987: 80–2) puts it: what glues the two factors together? Again, I shall share a com-
mon assumption on this issue: that where an account of the concept involves wide
conceptual roles, precisely which roles are involved is determined by the narrow
conceptual roles, perhaps together with contingent facts about the thinker’s envi-
ronment.39 So, for example, the narrow conceptual roles associated with water
determine a reference-ﬁxing description along the lines of as ‘the reference ofwater
is whatever property it is that is the (dominant) cause of predicative use of that
concept in the actual world’. As things contingently stand, this is H20 (things are
different on Twin Earth). Hence, the narrow conceptual roles, plus this contingent
fact about the world, determine that the connection between instances of H20 and
applications of the concept water is part of the latter’s wide conceptual role.
3.2. Narrow Conceptual Roles: Normative or Non-normative
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A second dimension that can be used to distinguish CRS-based accounts of con-
cepts concerns the normativity of narrow conceptual roles. Consider the following
conceptual role linking intentional states S1 and S2.
(S) S1→S2
On normative versions of CRS we can read ‘→’ as ‘makes rational’ or ‘rationally
commits one to’ or ‘makes rational if S1 is rational’ or ‘makes rational the inference
to’.40 On this view, (some) conceptual roles specify normative relations between in-
tentional states. Take the belief that grass is green. On one normative version of
CRS, this thought is partly individuated by the fact that being in this state rationally
commits one to believing that grass is coloured. On all versions of CRS, possessing a
concept requires mastering its conceptual roles; on normative versions of CRS,
such mastery is itself (partly) a normative matter.41
On non-normative versions of CRS, by contrast, we can read ‘→’ as ‘causes’ or
‘produces via an inferential process’ or ‘would, in appropriate conditions, produce
via an inferential process’ or ‘produces via a primitively compelling inferential pro-
cess’ or ‘is taken by the agent to obviously make legitimate the inference to …’ or
some combination of these. On this view, (narrow) conceptual roles specify non-
normative relations between intentional states, such as inferential relations.42 Take
the belief that grass is green. On one non-normative version of CRS, this thought is
partly individuated by the fact that agents in this state will ﬁnd the inference to the
belief that grass is coloured primitively compelling (in appropriate circumstances).43
On non-normative versions of CRS, mastering a concept requires a (general, defea-
sible) disposition to follow its content-determining conceptual roles, where this is a
non-normative matter.
One potential problem with normative versions of CRS is that they cannot pro-
vide the basis for a reductive account of normativity. A potential problem for non-
normative versions of CRS is that they cannot capture the plausible claim that mas-
tering a concept is inpart anormativematter.44Apotential problemwith anyversion
of CRS that employs the notion of inference in describing conceptual roles is that it
cannot provide a basis for a reductive account of intentionality (or at least, cannot in-
sofar as ‘inference’ is spelt out in intentional terms).45 I will not attempt to adjudicate
these disputes here. Instead I will assume that both normative and non-normative
versions of CRS, including versions that employ the notion of inference, are
viable for application to moral concepts. Consequently, the lessons I attempt
to draw for applying CRS to moral concepts will not involve taking sides in any
of these disputes.
3.3. Narrow Conceptual Roles: Beliefs or Desires
A third way of distinguishing CRS-based accounts of individual concepts is in
terms of whether the narrow conceptual roles in predicative uses involve connec-
tions with belief-like states or with desire-like motivating states (or both). For ex-
ample, a defender of CRS might claim that the belief that grass is green is given
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its content in part by a conceptual connection to another belief, viz. the belief that
grass is coloured. If all of the (narrow) conceptual roles that deﬁne a thought are con-
nections to beliefs in this way, then we can call the CRS-based account of the
thought ‘purely doxastic’. Likewise, a concept is purely doxastic if its contribution
to the conceptual roles of thoughts (in predicative uses) is only ever to connect
those thoughts with beliefs. Alternatively, someone might hold that the thought
that torture is wicked is given its content in part by a conceptual connection to a
non-belief-like state, such as approval or disapproval of torture (the former if
‘wicked’means ‘great’ the latter if it means ‘evil’). If some of the narrow conceptual
roles that deﬁne a thought are connections to motivating states in this way, then we
can say that the account of the concept is ‘conative’. Likewise, a concept is ‘cona-
tive’ if it contributes connections to such states. Note that under this terminology,
‘conative’ accounts will also include mixed cases, that is, cases which involve con-
nections both to belief-like and to motivating states.
4. Narrowing Down the Alternatives
CRS-based accounts of concepts can therefore be distinguished in at least three di-
mensions: according to the width, normativity and conative nature of their concep-
tual roles. Defenders of CRS in general need not apply exactly the same type of
theory to all concepts: they can, for example, allow that some concepts are differ-
entiated by wide and narrow conceptual roles, while others are differentiated by
narrow roles only. But for a given moral concept, there are at least eight variations
of conceptual role semantics to consider:
(1) Wide and narrow conceptual roles; narrow conceptual roles are normative;
narrow conceptual roles are purely doxastic.
(2) Wide and narrow conceptual roles; narrow conceptual roles are normative;
narrow conceptual roles are conative.
(3) Wide and narrow conceptual roles; narrow conceptual roles are non-norma-
tive; narrow conceptual roles are purely doxastic. (Cornell realism)
(4) Wide and narrow conceptual roles; narrow conceptual roles are non-norma-
tive; narrow conceptual roles are conative. (Australian realism)
(5) Narrow conceptual roles only; narrow conceptual roles are normative; narrow
conceptual roles are purely doxastic.
(6) Narrow conceptual roles only; narrow conceptual roles are normative; narrow
conceptual roles are conative. (Wedgwood)
(7) Narrow conceptual roles only; narrow conceptual roles are non-normative;
narrow conceptual roles are purely doxastic.
(8) Narrow conceptual roles only; narrow conceptual roles are non-normative;
narrow conceptual roles are conative. (Gibbard, Blackburn, Enoch)
Some of these theories of moral concepts are familiar from the existing literature
in metaethics. One version of (3) is elsewhere known as ‘Cornell Realism’. This
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theory models moral concepts on natural kind concepts such as water, which, we
saw above, are elucidated in terms of narrow plus wide conceptual roles.46 Assum-
ing conceptual roles reﬂect elements in a traditional-style conceptual analysis, (4)
includes versions of ‘Australian’ realism offered by Jackson and Smith.47 Several
versions of (8) have been defended by non-cognitivists, who argue that moral con-
cepts are conceptually tied to motivational states such as states of planning or par-
ticular kinds of approval and disapproval.48 Wedgwood has defended a version of
(6), which I discuss below (Section 5).
Several of these versions of CRS for moral concepts face serious problems. Con-
sider ﬁrst theories that specify narrow conceptual roles that are purely doxastic,
that is, (1), (3), (5) and (7). These theories will have trouble accommodating the
practicality of moral concepts, discussed above (Section 2). At least, if we accept
that moral concepts are interestingly conceptually tied to relevant motivation, then
any theory that elucidates those concepts solely in terms of conceptual connections
to non-motivational belief-like states will by that token be defective: such theories
cannot accommodate motivational internalism.
Consider next theories that include wide conceptual roles alongside narrow
roles, that is, (1), (2), (3) and (4). These theories face the problem that precisely
the sort of case that motivates the inclusion of wide conceptual roles in the case
of (some) non-moral concepts seems to motivate the exclusion of such roles in the
moral case. The case is Twin Earth.
In the case of non-moral concepts, such as water, the argument runs as follows.
Me and my twin on Twin Earth are exact physical duplicates of each other, at least
from the skin in. The difference between us is that I live in a world where the (dom-
inant) cause of thoughts about water is H20 and she lives in a world where the
dominant cause of thoughts about (twin-)water is XYZ. (The bracket is necessary
to leave open the issue whether my twin employs the concept we express by the
word ‘water’). The watery thoughts of me and my twin have different truth-condi-
tions. For example my thought that water is wet is true iff. H20 is wet, whereas my
twin’s thoughts that (twin-)water is wet is true iff. XYZ is wet. Since truth-conditions
are determined by content, our thoughts must have difference contents. But since,
by hypothesis, me and my twin are identical in terms of intracranial functional or-
ganisation (‘inside the head’), the difference in the contents of our thoughts must
be determined by relations outside the head, for example, by our causal relations
to properties in the world. Hence,—as the slogan almost goes—content ain’t
(purely) in the head. Hence, in the case of water, Twin Earth motivates the inclu-
sion of wide conceptual roles.49
Compare Moral Twin Earth.50 As before, my Moral Twin is an exact duplicate of
me from the skin in. The difference this time is that I live in a world where the
(dominant) cause of thoughts about rightness is the consequentialist property C,
whereas she lives in a world where the (dominant) cause of thoughts about right-
ness is the distinct deontological property D. Question: Do our rightness-thoughts
have different contents? Suppose my thought that Φ is right and my twin’s thought
that Φ is right have different contents, hence (assuming that content determines
truth-conditions) different truth-conditions. Call this ‘the supposition’. Suppose,
Conceptual Role Semantics and the Reference of Moral Concepts 13
© 2017 The Authors European Journal of Philosophy Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
for instance that my thought that Φ is right is true iff. Φ is C, and my twin’s
thought that Φ is right is true iff. Φ is D. Now imagine that I think that x is right
and my twin thinks that x is right. According to the supposition, any agreement
between us is merely superﬁcial: although it appears as if we are agreeing, we
are in fact at cross purposes, having distinct thoughts. Indeed it may be that one
of our thoughts is true and the other false (if x is C but not D, for example). Like-
wise, imagine I think that y is right and my twin thinks that y is not right. Accord-
ing to the supposition, any disagreement between us is merely superﬁcial. In
particular, since our thoughts about rightness have different truth-conditions, both
our thoughts could be true (if y is C but not D, for example). Both these conse-
quences are unpalatable. Intuitively, me and my twin are in agreement about the
morality of x—speciﬁcally, about its rightness—and in disagreement about the mo-
rality of y. We should reject any supposition that entails otherwise. Hence, we
should reject the supposition that my thoughts and my twin’s thought about right-
ness have difference contents and (hence) different truth-conditions.51
Thus, in the moral case, not only does the argument in favour of including wide
conceptual roles not go through but the Twin Earth scenarios also suggest that
moral content is in the head. For if agreement and disagreement about the right-
ness of Φ require that me and my twin have the same concept of rightness, then
these facts about our agreement and disagreement show that our concepts are
the same.52 But then it seems that the best explanation of this similarity in content
is similarity of functional roles inside the head. Hence, for moral concepts, mean-
ing just is in the head.53 If so, any account of moral concepts that includes con-
tent-determining relations outside the head—that is, that includes wide
conceptual roles—is defective. Hence, we should reject theories (1)–(4).
5. Wedgwood and Robust Reference
Consider, ﬁnally, theories (6) and (8). These have distinct advantages. The connec-
tion to motivational states allows these views to accommodate the practicality and
irreducibility of moral concepts. That same connection allows an explanation of the
intuitions at work in the Moral Twin Earth argument. Those intuitions were that
me and my twin were in substantive agreement about the rightness of x and in
substantive disagreement about the rightness of y. A connection to motivational
states locates this agreement and disagreement. In the ﬁrst case, we are in agree-
ment about x because we have the same attitude towards it (and, perhaps, no mo-
tive to change the other ’s attitude) and in the second case are in disagreement
about y because we have opposed attitudes towards it (and, perhaps, motive to
change the other ’s attitude). Thus, a connection to motivational states, such as that
posited by theories (6) and (8), explains the thought that me and my twin agree
about the rightness of x and disagree about the rightness of y.
I will not consider the differences between (6) and (8), that is, the issue of the
normativity of narrow conceptual roles. Instead I will address the issue of the con-
sequences of adopting such a CRS-based account of moral concepts. In particular I
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want to answer the following question: Can a CRS account of moral concepts,
along the lines of (6) or (8), be plausibly combined with cognitivism about moral
concepts? My answer will be ‘No’. I conclude that the most plausible form of con-
ceptual role semantics for moral concepts supports non-cognitivism in metaethics.
Wedgwood defends a version of (6), and Enoch (2011: 177-84) adheres to Wedg-
wood’s programme but for his rejection of the claim that ‘the intentional is norma-
tive’; that is, Enoch adopts a Wedgwoodian version of (8). Wedgwood’s focus is on
‘thin’ moral concepts, speciﬁcally the concept expressed by ‘x is (all things consid-
ered) a better thing for z to do at time t than y’ (in Wedgwood 2001) and the con-
cept of practical ought (in Wedgwood 2007). I will focus on the former, although
the points I make apply equally to Wedgwood’s account of the latter.
According to Wedgwood, concepts are individuated by the basic rules of ratio-
nality governing their use.54 These rules are basic insofar as they are ‘fundamental
truths of rationality, which cannot be explained on the basis of any more basic prin-
ciples about how it is rational to use the concept… in thought’.55 For the concept x
is (all things considered) a better thing for me to do at time t than y—which can
be abbreviated to B(x,y,me,t)—the sole basic rule of rationality is the following rule
of practical reasoning:
(R1) Acceptance of B(x,y,me,t) commits one to having a conditional intention to
do x rather than y.56
Where a ‘conditional intention’ is an intention to do x rather than y if one does
either.57 According to Wedgwood, one intentional state ‘commits’ one to another
intentional state just in case, if being in the ﬁrst state is rational then so is being
in the second (at least if the question of whether or not to adopt the second state
arises).58 So we can read (R1) as:
(R1*) If acceptance of B(x,y,me,t) is rational then a conditional intention to do x
rather than y is rational.
In common with all versions of CRS, Wedgwood holds that possessing a con-
cept individuated by certain roles involves mastering those roles.59 In particular,
he holds that possessing a concept requires a non-derivative mastery, or disposi-
tion to follow, the basic rules of rationality that deﬁne the concept. A mastery or
disposition to follow a set of rules involves generally following those rules non-ac-
cidentally (where this involves, at some level, some grasp of the fact that these are
the basic rules) and is also (for Wedgwood) partly a normative matter.60 Hence, for
Wedgwood, possessing a concept is not just a matter of actually following certain
conceptual roles, it is a matter of it being the case that one rationally ought, in some
sense, to instantiate those roles. Finally, a mastery or disposition to follow a rule is
non-derivative just when it is not due to having some independent justiﬁcation for
following those rules.61
Wedgwood does not rest here. He claims that the conceptual roles deﬁnitive of a
given concept determine its semantic value, and more particularly, in the case of
Conceptual Role Semantics and the Reference of Moral Concepts 15
© 2017 The Authors European Journal of Philosophy Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
moral concepts, the relevant conceptual roles determine that moral concepts refer
to robust worldly properties. In this way, Wedgwood combines CRS for moral
terms with metaethical cognitivism, and more recently, Enoch has followed this
trend.62 As Wedgwood puts it, a conceptual connection to motivating states man-
ages to conjure up a ‘distinctively practical mode of presentation’ of a real worldly
property.63 Let us examine this combination of views.
Begin with semantic value. The semantic value of a concept is the contribution it
makes to the truth-conditions of the thoughts in which it appears.64 Hence, the
truth-conditions of thoughts are determined by the semantic values of their constit-
uents. Since the constituents of thoughts are concepts, then concepts must deter-
mine their semantic values. If we are to give an account of concepts in terms of
conceptual roles, then it follows that the conceptual roles associated with a given
concept must determine that concept’s semantic value.65
All this is platitudinous. But, how, precisely, do conceptual roles determine se-
mantic value? To answer this question is to provide a ‘determination theory’ for
a concept (Peacocke 1992: 17–19). More precisely, since in the present context we
are concerned only with predicative concepts, how do conceptual roles for predica-
tive concepts determine the semantic values of those concepts?
Consider ﬁrst a deﬂationary determination theory. Suppose the truth-conditions
of a given thought are given by the deﬂationary T-schema, thus:
(T) {x is F} is true iff. x is F.66
The semantic value of the predicative concept F is its contribution it makes to
the truth-conditions of the thoughts in which it appears. Then, we can say, for a
thought of the form {x is …}, the contribution made by a predicative concept F,
when substituted into the ‘…’ position, is to generate a sentence which is true iff.
x is F. So Fmakes the following contribution to truth-values: it generates a thought
which is true when applied to things that are F and a thought that is false when
applied to things that are not F (note the disquoting here). Since ‘semantic value’
is just contribution to truth-conditions, this is F’s (deﬂationary) semantic value:
the semantic value of F is the set of F-things.67 In short, if truth-conditions are un-
derstood in deﬂationary terms and semantic value is just contribution to truth con-
ditions, then semantic value is also deﬂationary.68 Importantly, this account of a
semantic value does not require that such concepts be taken to refer to robust
worldly properties. We can therefore satisfy the above platitudes about concepts
and their semantic values without a robust referential semantics. In particular,
we can accept that, if CRS is true, conceptual roles must determine semantic value,
without holding that these conceptual roles necessitate reference to robust worldly
properties. Understood in deﬂationary terms, the semantic value of F is simply the
set of things which are F, that is, the extension of F.
Wedgwood’s view involves more than the deﬂationary determination theory. It
holds that predicative concepts often refer to or ‘stand for’what I am calling robust
worldly properties (Wedgwood 2001: 5 cf. Peacocke 1992: 16 ff.; Enoch 2011: 3–5).
Hence, the semantic values of these concepts are robust properties. These concepts
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are true of their extensions because members of those extensions instantiate those
properties. Hence, Wedgwood cannot accept the deﬂationary theory as the whole
story about how concepts determine their semantic values. Consider instead the al-
ternative, ‘best sense’ determination theory:
(BS) The semantic value of a concept is the semantic assignment that makes ‘cor-
rect’ or ‘makes best sense of’ the conceptual roles deﬁnitive of that concept.69
This needs elucidation. Peacocke explains this as the view that we should assign
semantic values in such a way as that the
… belief-forming practices mentioned in a concept’s possession conditions
are correct. That is, in the case of belief formation, the practices result in
true beliefs, and in the case of principles of inference, they result in
truth-preserving inferences. (Peacocke 1992: 19)
Consider the belief or thought that x is F, which I shall abbreviate to {x is F}.
Peacocke is envisaging two types of conceptual roles for this belief. The ﬁrst is a
‘belief-forming role’, which speciﬁes a condition, W, not itself a belief, under which
the belief is to be formed. That is,
(B1) W→ {x is F}
Here, W might be a perceptual experience or a worldly condition. Suppose in
this case it is a worldly condition, such as x’s being green. Hence, (B1) speciﬁes a
wide conceptual role.
The second type of conceptual role that Peacocke considers involves inferential
relations between beliefs, such as
(B2) {x is F}→ {x is coloured}
Peacocke’s thought is that we should assign a semantic value to F such that in
the case of W, the belief that x is F is true (this is the requirement provided by
(B1)). And such that the inference from x is F to x is coloured is truth-preserving,
i.e. such that in the inference given in (B2), the consequent is true if the antecedent
is. A plausible assignment is therefore the property of being green. Hence, the se-
mantic value of F is a robust worldly property, viz., the colour green.
Wedgwood modiﬁes Peacocke’s theory in two crucial ways. First, by extending
it. In (B1) and (B2), the only mental states involved are beliefs. Peacocke’s stated
theory doesn’t cover cases where conceptual roles involve connections to non-be-
lief-like propositional attitudes, such as desires and intentions. Wedgwood extends
the theory to cover this sort of case. In particular, Wedgwood claims that we
should assign semantic values in such a way as to make the conceptual roles that
individuate a concept both valid and complete.70 A role linking two intentional
states is valid just in case it is necessary that if the ‘input’ state is correct then the
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‘output’ state is uniquely correct. A role linking two intentional states is complete
just in case the output state is correct only if the input state is correct.71 Crucially,
Wedgwood claims, correctness can apply both to motivational states, such as de-
sires and intentions, and to beliefs.72
We are now in a position to see howWedgwood determines the semantic values
of moral concepts. Consider B(x,y,me,t), deﬁned by the rule
(R1) {B(x,y,me,t)}→Conditional intention to do x rather than y.
According toWedgwood, the semantic value of B(x,y,me,t) is that property which
makes it the case that if instantiated by me, x, y and t, makes it correct for me at t to
have the conditional intention to do x rather than y. As Wedgwood puts it:
The semantic value … must be that four-place relation between, x, y [me]
and t, such that, necessarily, it is correct for [me] to prefer doing x over do-
ing y at t and a mistake for [me] to prefer doing y over x at t if, and only if,
x, y, [me], and t stand in that relation. (Wedgwood 2001: 19)
And latter, more simply:
… the reference or semantic value of the [concept B(x,y,me,t)] must be the
relation of being (all things considered) a better thing to do. (Wedgwood
2001: 21)
Thus, unlike the deﬂationary determination theory,Wedgwood’s viewdetermines
that moral predicative concepts have as their semantic values robust properties.
It is helpful to put aside the complexities of Wedgwood’s account for the mo-
ment and focus the form of its claims. The theory employs a purely narrow con-
cept-constitutive conceptual role—(R1)—to determine a real, robust worldly
referent for the related concept. Roles purely inside the head thereby establish a
connection between the world and what’s inside the head. This is somewhat sur-
prising. As Schroeter and Schroeter (2003: 201-2) point out, if we are to interpret
B(x,y,me,t) as a genuinely referential concept (that is, as a concept whose semantic
value is a robust property), we would imagine that someone who grasps the con-
cept would be disposed (ceteris paribus) to show some sort of sensitivity to the
world, speciﬁcally some sort of sensitivity to the property that is that concept’s se-
mantic value. But Wedgwood’s account doesn’t demand this, only that the inner
conceptual roles are in order. As Schroeter and Schroeter explain:
A subject who has non-derivative mastery of rule [(R1)] shows no signs of
taking the target predicate [or concept] to be answerable to a [robust]
normative property. Commonsense interpretative charity militates against
importing a [robust] normative element into the semantic assignment when
the subject’s use of the predicate [or concept] is not answerable to any norma-
tive property. [Wedgwood’s theory] thus provide[s] the wrong determination
theory for an expression governed by [(R1)]: the semantic value of such an
expression [or concept] is not a [robust] normative property (2003: 202).73
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Indeed, this point can be extended to an objection to any view, such as Wedg-
wood’s, that combines a purely narrow conceptual role semantics with the addi-
tional claim that the concepts so deﬁned have as their semantic values robust
properties (for example, Enoch’s view). Most generally, it is implausible to suppose
that a concept refers to a worldly property when competence with that concept is
compatible with no disposition whatsoever to be sensitive to any worldly property.
Something has gone wrong in Wedgwood’s account. How can purely narrow
conceptual roles inside the head determine a robust worldly referent? Note this
is not something that Peacocke holds is possible, even though Wedgwood takes
Peacocke as his inspiration for his determination theory. For Peacocke’s general de-
termination theory allows for the possibility of wide conceptual roles (roles that
start outside the head)—this is why I noted earlier that Wedgwood makes two
modiﬁcations to Peacocke’s account of determination theories.74 The second mod-
iﬁcation is to give a general form of a determination theory that also covers cases
where concepts are individuated in terms of purely narrow conceptual roles. This
is what creates the problem, in such cases, of bridging the gap between narrow
roles and robust worldly referents.
How might Wedgwood bridge this gap? To the above criticism from Schroeter
and Schroeter, he might argue:
I accept that the account of moral concepts in terms of conceptual roles
such as (R1) doesn’t by itself sufﬁce to interpret those concepts as referring
to robust properties. But there are good independent arguments for think-
ing that moral concepts refer to such properties. Once those arguments are
in place, the question is not “Do moral concepts refer to robust proper-
ties?” but “Which robust properties do they refer to?”. To this latter ques-
tion, my general determination theory gives an answer: they refer to
those properties which make the conceptual roles that individuate them
both valid and complete. Thus my argument has two stages: ﬁrst estab-
lishing in general the claim moral concepts are robustly referential; second
triangulating their reference via their content-constitutive conceptual
roles.
This is in fact the strategy that Wedgwood adopts (and Enoch follows): in both
his defences of CRS for moral concepts Wedgwood notes that there are indepen-
dent arguments for taking the semantic value of moral concepts to be robust
properties.75 But this reply faces an uncomfortable dilemma. Either the semantic
value of moral concepts is solely determined by narrow conceptual roles, such
as (R1), or it is not. If it is then there is no justiﬁcation for taking this semantic
value to be any worldly property; indeed, there is good reason to think that the
semantic value is not any worldly property, since competence with robustly refer-
ential concepts typically requires some sort of sensitivity to the world (this is
Schroeter and Schroeter’s point). Alternatively, if the semantic value of moral
concepts is not solely by narrow conceptual roles then either it is determined by
such roles plus wide conceptual roles or it is determined by considerations outside
of the theory of what it is to possess concepts, that is, outside of the theory of
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conceptual roles. The former would involve moving to a theory of CRS for moral
concepts that includes wide conceptual roles, which is both implausible (given
the Moral Twin Earth argument) and not compatible with Wedgwood’s repeated
claim that a complete account of moral concepts can be given in terms of purely
narrow roles.76 The latter is also implausible. On this view it is not the case that
the content of concepts determines their semantic value; for example, it is not the
case that the content of moral concepts determines their robust referents. As we
saw above (Section 2), a theory of concepts is a theory of what it is to possess a
concept, and according to Wedgwood, what it is to master moral concepts is to
master conceptual roles. But mastering such roles does not by itself, on the cur-
rent view, determine the referent of the concept. It would be possible, for in-
stance, for there to be two concepts, both individuated solely by rule (R1), but
one of which refers to a robust property and the other of which does not. This
is implausible. It is implausible to think that two concepts could contribute in dif-
ferent ways to the truth-conditions of the thoughts in which they appear, and yet
the mastery of those concepts consists in exactly the same propositional-attitude-
forming abilities. Most generally it is implausible to deny, as this part of the di-
lemma must, that the contribution of a concept to truth-conditions is determined
solely by its possession conditions.77
Some further points about this dilemma may serve to elucidate it. First, the ﬁrst
horn of the dilemma (i.e. the claim that content is solely determined by narrow con-
ceptual roles, which do not determine a robust referent) seems to be the correct place
to sit in the case of the concepts of the logical constants, such as negation, on which
Wedgwood (perhaps unfortunately for his cognitivism) models his account of moral
concepts.78 The conceptual roles that deﬁne the concepts of logical concepts are
purely narrow, but it is also the case that these concepts are not understood as refer-
ring to robust properties. Although it is sometimes said, in a Fregean spirit, that log-
ical constants ‘refer’ to truth-functions, we must not confuse this terminology for a
substantive account. As Field notes:
… it is hard to see how to give any account of “reference to” truth func-
tions unless we construe the claim that “¬” refers to a certain truth-function
as really a claim about the role that “¬” plays in our conceptual scheme. And
if we do so construe the claim, then we can see that “reference to truth-
functions” is an unnecessary diversion ….(Field 1977: 402)
Second, the ﬁrst horn of the dilemma is in fact a more general (and more an-
cient) problem for CRS. This is the problem of the ‘word-world’ linkage, that is,
the problem of how conceptual roles inside the head can link up with properties
in the world. It was versions of this problem that in part motivated the move to in-
clude wide conceptual roles in a complete account of content. But this is the move,
in the moral case, which Wedgwood explicitly rejects. Peacocke, as previously
noted, can accept this face-saving move, since he is happy to include wide concep-
tual roles in his theory of concepts.
In sum, the problem Wedgwood faces is this. The narrow conceptual roles that
he takes to deﬁne moral concepts are insufﬁcient, by themselves, to determine a
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robust referent for those concepts. Wedgwood may argue that robust reference is
secured by considerations outside the theory of conceptual possession-conditions,
but this would be to sever the plausible connection between the theory of what it
is to possess concepts and the theory of what determines their semantic value.
6. Conclusion
I have argued that
• For moral concepts, a plausible CRS (a) excludes wide conceptual roles (b) in-
volves narrow conceptual roles linking moral judgements to motivational states
(Sections 2, 4).
• That such an account cannot plausibly be combined with the claim that moral
concepts refer to robust properties (Section 5).
This leaves metaethical non-cognitivism as the true beneﬁciary of conceptual role
semantics for moral concepts.79
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NOTES
1 For the application of the distinct theory of teleosemantics to the moral case, see Sin-
clair (2012).
2 I use bold to refer to concepts. By a ‘robust property’ I mean a property that is gen-
uine constituent of the world, something that will necessarily be quantiﬁed over in our best
account of what types of thing the world contains. I intend this term to be neutral with re-
spect to debates about the correct methodology for ontology and also be consistent with
the view that there are various types of robust property (e.g. natural vs. artiﬁcial, reducible
vs. irreducible, metaphysically fundamental vs. metaphysically derivative, causally inert vs.
causally efﬁcacious and so on). By contrast there is a minimal property of Fness whenever
there is a predicate ‘F’ that can be warrantedly applied to some objects. In the minimal sense,
properties may be no more than ‘the semantic shadows of predicates’ (Blackburn 1993: 8).
3 Of course, both beliefs and desires can be implicated in motivation. By referring to
‘motivating’ states I mean to refer to those that have a connection to action characteristic of
states with a desire-like ‘direction of ﬁt’. See Humberstone (1992).
4 See Wedgwood (2007: 59 ff). The notion of semantically evaluable content comes
from Fodor (1987: 11).
5 Henceforth I use italics to refer to propositional contents.
6 Peacocke (1992: 3); and Wedgwood (2007: 59, 81).
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7 Peacocke (1992: 2); and Botterill and Carruthers 1999: 132.
8 See Peacocke (1992: 3, 32–3; 1996: 441). This is controversial. Harman (1982) offers a
conceptual role semantics that takes all linguistic meaning to derive from the expression of
concepts. This debate is tangential to those considered in this paper, since all sides in the cur-
rent dispute agree that moral expressions express moral concepts.
9 Peacocke (1992: 2).
10 Field (1977), Horwich (1994),Wedgwood (2001) and Enoch (2011: 177–84) focus on
linguistic meaning; Harman (1982), Block (1986), Peacocke (1992), Botterill & Carruthers
(1999) and Wedgwood (2007) focus on mental content. Block (1987) notes the possibility of a
theory applying to all representations. The following are all logical possibilities: (i) conceptual
role semantics applies independently to both mental concepts and items in public languages
(cf. Horwich 2005: 7–9, ch. 7); (ii) conceptual role semantics applies directly only to concepts,
with linguistic expressions deriving their content (meaning) from expressive relations to con-
cepts or thoughts (cf. Harman 1982); and (iii) conceptual role semantics applies directly only to
items in a public language, with concepts deriving their content from relations to these.
11 One obvious connection is provided by the broadly Lockean view that ‘[t]he mean-
ings of linguistic expressions are determined by the contents of the concepts and thoughts
they can be used to express’ (Harman 1982: 242; see also Wedgwood 2007: 82–3). For doubts,
see Loewer (1982: 308–9) and Davidson (1975).
12 Of course, particular pieces of theoretical and practical reasoning are often parts of
some larger reasoning process: see Broome (2009).
13 Botterill & Carruthers (1999: 177). For ease of reading, I will henceforth remove the
qualiﬁcation concerning ‘actual and hypothetical’ conceptual roles.
14 Field (1977: fn. 19); Block (1987: 164; 1986: 667).
15 Wedgwood (2007: 161–5).
16 For this argument, see Field (1977: 389–90); Loewer (1982: 310–11); Fodor (1987):
73–6; Botterill and Carruthers (1999: 178).
17 Explicit statements of this argument are rare, but see Loar (1982: 276); Loewer
(1982: 310); Peacocke (1992: 1–40); and Millar (1994: 74) for intimations.
18 As Peacocke notes, this claim is an analogue in the theory of mental content of
Dummett’s claim that a theory of linguistic meaning is a theory of understanding: see
Dummett (1975). Compare Millar (1994), who cites Wittgenstein as inspiration.
19 Block (1987: 165). See also Wedgwood (2007: 164).
20 Moore (1903: §13); Ayer (1946: 138–9); Snare (1975); Wedgwood (2007: 68–9). Note
that Moore’s argument is more commonly presented as an argument against reductive def-
initions of moral terms, but it is here transposed as an argument against reductive analyses
of moral concepts.
21 Wedgwood (2007: 66).
22 For the former, see Jackson (1998: 150–3); for the latter, see Scanlon (1998: ch. 1).
23 See Peacocke (1992: 149) and Heal (1996: 414).
24 See Peacocke (1992: 12). Note that some philosophers hold that most, if not all, con-
cepts are ‘prototypical’ in this way, hence do not submit to traditional conceptual analysis.
The history of failed conceptual analyses would seem to support this view. See Botterill
and Carruthers (1999: 185), Stich (1992) and Tye (1992). Another example concerns CRS as
applied to logical constants, where the very notion of traditional conceptual analysis (that
is, as a particular completion of the schema: ‘x is F iff…’) seems misconceived. See Peacocke
(1987) and Wedgwood (2007: 82–8).
25 For this point as it applies to connections to motivational states, see Wedgwood
(2001: 27–30); Schroeter and Schroeter (2003: 195). Compare Gibbard (2003: chs. 1–2).
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26 Johnstone 1989: 157 ff.
27 This ‘practical’ open question argument can be traced back at least to Hare (1961:
41–3, 81). See also Jackson (1998: 153) and Wedgwood (2007: 69–72) and Darwall/
Gibbard/Railton (1992). Blackburn (1998: 70) employs a similar premise in an argument
for expressivism.
28 See Sinclair (2007).
29 See, for example, Svavarsdottir (1999) and Wedgwood (2007: 23–34).
30 See, for example, Smith (1994: 71–6). For doubts, see Merli (2009).
31 SeeWedgwood (2007: 97) for one particular version of this general form of argument.
32 One variation not discussed here concerns holistic and non-holistic versions of
CRS. The former take all of a thought’s conceptual roles to determine its content, the latter
only a proper subset of those roles. The versions of CRS that I discuss below are non-holistic.
For discussion, see Fodor (1987: 55–95), Fodor and Lepore (1992: 163–186) and Botterill and
Carruthers (1999: 181–4).
33 See Block (1987: 170–9); Harman (1987); Loar (1982); Field (1977); McGinn (1982);
Peacocke (1992: 113, 185); Horwich (1994).
34 For asymmetric dependence, see Fodor (1987: 107–9).
35 Block (1987: 167–72).
36 Harman (1987).
37 Some have argued that narrow content is problematic, which may mitigate in fa-
vour of the non-solipsistic view. For arguments of this kind, see Burge (1979,1986). For de-
fences of narrow content, see Fodor (1987: 27–53) and Botterill & Carruthers (1999: 131–60).
38 See, for example, Field (1977), Block (1987) and Harman (1987). Note that Wedg-
wood (2007: 61–65) considers and rejects an account of moral concepts that involves only
wide conceptual roles. For the sake of argument, this paper accepts Wedgwood’s argument.
39 See Block (1986: 643–4); Loar (1982: 279); Schroeter and Schroeter (2003: fn. 2).
40 For normative versions of CRS, see Wedgwood (2001, 2007), Millar (1994) and
Brandom (1994).
41 See Wedgwood (2001: fn. 17, and 2007: 84–6, fn. 10, 161–73).
42 See Block (1987: 160–1), Field (1977), Peacocke (1992: 139), Horwich (1994) and
Millar (1994). Enoch (2011: 177–184) also seems to favour a non-normative version of CRS.
43 For Peacocke, an inference is primitively compelling for an agent just in case (i) the
agent ﬁnds it compelling, (ii) the agent does not ﬁnd it compelling because it can be derived
from other premises or principles and (iii) the agent does not treat the veracity of the infer-
ence as answerable to anything else (1992: 6, 134–7). For critical discussion and a proposed
modiﬁcation, see Millar (1994: 76–8).
44 See Millar (1994: 79–80), Rey (1996: 420–1) and Papineau (1996: 431). See Horwich
(1994: 151–2; 2005: 104–133) and Peacocke (1996) for replies.
45 Block (1987: 160–1). See Botterill and Carruthers (1999: 185–90) for a response.
46 See, for instance, Boyd (1988). Compare Wedgwood (2007: 58–66), which takes
Cornell realism to include only wide conceptual roles.
47 Smith (1994) and Jackson (1998).
48 See Blackburn (1998) and Gibbard (2003).
49 For the Twin Earth argument, see Putnam (1975). For its extension to non-natural-
kind terms (or concepts), see Burge (1979). As a motive for including wide conceptual roles,
see Block (1987) and Field (1977).
50 The following argument is adapted from Horgan and Timmons (1992).
51 One could also, of course, reject the idea that content determines truth-conditions
and claim that the thoughts of me and my twin have the same content (hence are the same
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thoughts) but have different truth-conditions (see, for example, Botterill and Carruthers
1999: 137). I do not want to question this move here, for it accepts the current point, namely,
that moral content is in the head (since it is only ‘inside the head’ that my twin and I are
similar).
52 The general validity of this move—from disagreement to sameness of concept de-
ployed—has been questioned by Plunkett & Sundell (2013), given the possibility of some
cases of disagreement (e.g. metalinguistic negotiations) with no shared concept. However,
it is not obvious (and Plunkett and Sundell do not present an argument for thinking that)
the particular disagreement in the Moral Twin Earth case is of this type, rather than of the
type where disagreement is based in shared concepts. For more general doubts about the
value of intuitions regarding disagreement for metasemantic theory, see Dowell (2016).
53 One might resist this argument by claiming that agreement and disagreement do
not require me and my Twin’s concepts to be exactly the same, so long as they are sufﬁciently
similar to frame dispute (see, for example, Copp 2000 and van Roojen 2006). But this seems
not to capture the full force of the intuitions in the Twin Earth case: for me and my Twin
agree (in the ﬁrst case) and disagree (in the second case) about precisely this: the rightness
of Φ. We are not somewhat in agreement about the rightness and somewhat not in
agreement.
54 Wedgwood (2001: 6, 2007: 82).
55 2007: 84. See also 2001: 7.
56 It is a little unclear why this amounts to a rule of practical reasoning, since the con-
nection between the two mental states is one of ‘rationally committing’ rather than ‘infer-
ence’. I put this point to one side here.
57 Wedgwood (2001: 15–16).
58 Wedgwood (2007: 84).
59 Wedgwood (2007: 161–73).
60 Wedgwood (2001: 8) uses the terminology of ‘mastery’; 2007: 84–6 uses the termi-
nology of ‘following’. Both note that the notion is ultimately normative: 2001: fn. 17 and
2007: 86 fn. 10.
61 Wedgwood (2001:8 and 2007: 85–6).
62 Wedgwood (2001: 18–19 and 2007: 5–6, 99–100); Enoch (2011: 177–84).
63 Wedgwood (2007: 80). I use the term ‘conjure’ because it is unclear how a connec-
tion to motivational states manages to provide a distinctive mode of presentation, as op-
posed to a distinctive connection to motivation.
64 Wedgwood (2001: 5). Some non-cognitivists, of course, will prefer a broader con-
ception of semantic value as contribution to context-independent content (or something of
that sort), but for the time being I am happy to work within Wedgwood’s framework.
65 For this argument, see Peacocke (1992: 16); Horwich (1994: 141–51); Schroeter and
Schroeter (2003: 192).
66 I here express the T-schema in terms of the truth conditions of thoughts rather than
sentences. For more standard expressions and defences, see Horwich (1990) and Field (1986).
67 This argument is a particular application of a general form of argument given in
Horwich (1994: 141–4).
68 Alternatively, one might say that, on this view, the semantic values of predicates
are deﬂationary properties, where deﬂationary properties are just ‘the semantic shadows
of predicates’; see note 2.
69 See Peacocke (1992: 19, 26, 133–43); Wedgwood (2001: 9, 18–19, 2007: 86–7, 99);
Enoch (2011: 179); and Schroeter and Schroeter (2003: 192, 195–6).
70 Wedgwood (2001: 9–11, 2007: 86–7).
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71 Wedgwood (2001: 10–11, 2007: 87). See also Schroeter and Schroeter (2003:
196–7).
72 Wedgwood (2001: 19–20).
73 Wedgwood (2007, 99–100) does consider Schroeter and Schroeter’s (2003) critique
but not this part of it.
74 See Peacocke (1992: 113, 185).
75 Wedgwood (2001: 5–6, 2007: 97); Enoch (2011: 177).
76 Wedgwood (2001: 15; 2007: 97).
77 See Peacocke (1992: 22–3). This view also involves denying that Peacocke calls ‘The
Identiﬁcation’, namely, that possessing a concept is knowing what it is for something to be
its semantic value.
78 Wedgwood (2001: 6-12, 2007: 82–9); cf. Enoch (2011: 178–9).
79 Fellowship from the Arts and Humanities Research Council, UK. Grant number:
AH/I002707/1
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